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08 c6 3a 0c 76 a9 67 f2 d4

Netgear Signed TLS Cert Private Key Disclosure Overview There are at least two valid, signed TLS certificates that are bundled with publicly available Netgear device firmware. These certificates are trusted by browsers on all platforms, but will surely be added to revocation lists shortly. The firmware images that contained these certificates along with their private keys were publicly available for download through Netgear's support website, without authentication; thus anyone in the world could have retrieved these keys. routerlogin. net Both keys found were contained in the R9000-V1. downloads. netgear. entrust. routerlogin. net Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public-Key: 2048 bit Modulus: 00:c9:6d:0a:79:c9:ca:64:cd:ea:f0:ac:f4:bf:f6: 37:2b:1b:5a:f9:2c:10:52:d6:ee:4e:21:d3:00:2b: 18:fd:08:a0:6b:92:26:86:40:26:ef:f3:b7:dc:4d: 63:b8:04:0e:a0:78:bc:87:4e:50:d6:2d:3c:d4:f1: ed:b8:10:9c:bf:e7:eb:59:a9:19:4d:f7:dc:73:9d: b0:13:0a:29:41:4e:47:25:25:11:18:64:83:67:bd: 77:6d:22:b3:1f:df:db:29:09:20:d9:a1:3f:67:95: 83:ce:7e:02:c8:6f:46:46:f5:60:1b:75:30:8a:dc: c4:a0:e6:e3:97:e0:f5:d7:ce:15:21:2d:26:c2:ef: 66:a6:79:bf:ac:28:af:e2:d4:7f:6e:8d:31:a5:07: fa:c6:e2:91:cc:b0:cf:c8:27:4c:f1:8d:d8:14:8b: ca:d5:c7:2b:10:72:12:66:63:46:02:1b:f2:ab:8a: a2:1c:18:39:1f:4c:ed:a9:ca:ed:e7:05:96:a6:6a: a0:ab:76:bd:68:c6:ee:43:4d:e4:51:ce:79:a3:0b: 81:7c:ea:67:87:75:03:25:ee:5f:f9:67:d7:12:a8: 76:c5:a3:37:35:5f:d1:61:26:ab:9a:f3:b3:7d:4d: d1:24:73:ed:d7:74:3e:e8:b9:d5:4e:d7:9f:b5:f2: 46:c5 Exponent: 65537 0x10001 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:www. routerlogin. net, DNS:routerlogin. net, DNS:www. routerlogin. com, DNS:routerlogin. com CT Precertificate SCTs: Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : 55:81:D4:C2:16:90:36:01:4A:EA:0B:9B:57:3C:53:F0: C0:E4:38:78:70:25:08:17:2F:A3:AA:1D:07:13:D3:0C Timestamp : May 1 00:53:53. 294 2019 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:44:02:20:0B:F3:9B:CB:60:8F:CE:00:51:E5:BE:2A: 61:21:2D:F6:4A:4F:AE:A8:B6:86:6D:D4:3F:30:1B:93: 42:C5:F5:B0:02:20:24:62:CD:72:37:EF:B9:D9:25:DF: 28:BC:56:E3:79:B2:21:14:58:2B:4B:05:78:D2:69:66: 8E:89:1A:65:32:4C Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : 87:75:BF:E7:59:7C:F8:8C:43:99:5F:BD:F3:6E:FF:56: 8D:47:56:36:FF:4A:B5:60:C1:B4:EA:FF:5E:A0:83:0F Timestamp : May 1 00:53:53. 333 2019 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:44:02:20:16:80:A7:86:0B:EA:DD:3F:0A:6B:5D:10: 1E:C3:E2:8A:92:F7:6F:28:85:9D:64:FA:CF:24:F8:02: C5:A5:15:0C:02:20:34:D0:90:D7:4C:6D:14:56:49:5C: DC:A6:B1:18:BC:29:32:F0:37:0A:B7:A9:5F:43:37:DC: B2:F2:A4:FA:FA:AA Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : 56:14:06:9A:2F:D7:C2:EC:D3:F5:E1:BD:44:B2:3E:C7: 46:76:B9:BC:99:11:5C:C0:EF:94:98:55:D6:89:D0:DD Timestamp : May 1 00:53:53. 346 2019 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:45:02:21:00:86:C3:D7:ED:C6:80:41:33:FC:6F:8F: 36:00:67:BB:58:F4:52:85:D7:1F:EF:46:E5:E1:1C:1F: 55:40:75:EC:DB:02:20:4B:2A:41:34:4D:5E:FD:FA:87: C5:E8:A1:26:9C:EF:DE:BA:09:7A:24:6D:8E:2A:46:6F: 12:EB:4B:DE:A4:5E:62 Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : F6:5C:94:2F:D1:77:30:22:14:54:18:08:30:94:56:8E: E3:4D:13:19:33:BF:DF:0C:2F:20:0B:CC:4E:F1:64:E3 Timestamp : May 1 00:53:53. entrust. crl X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2. 840. 114028. entrust. 140. entrust. entrust. cer X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:82:A2:70:74:DD:BC:53:3F:CF:7B:D4:F7:CD:7F:A7:60:C6:0A:4C:BF X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 5D:17:F2:BC:F7:B8:2D:0B:B8:4C:E8:EA:A2:79:E9:10:65:29:62:9D X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA:FALSE Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption 21:36:ac:a8:3a:e8:47:17:90:dd:d8:5c:e0:27:78:f1:d6:f9: b8:94:29:64:76:8f:79:4c:51:7b:c6:2c:e7:78:4f:6c:c3:3c: 18:55:3e:48:ba:0d:65:2f:5c:0c:7a:8c:8b:cd:7e:d9:fc:e3: 89:54:07:41:2c:e9:f6:7f:bc:eb:22:e0:45:20:5c:5b:1d:87: 9c:19:38:76:fd:65:67:57:43:8e:eb:5d:1d:4e:81:bd:7e:53: 0a:7b:85:aa:13:ba:7e:bc:eb:87:2d:51:44:3e:5b:54:71:82: b0:a4:69:4a:7d:f9:ea:df:51:f2:f8:53:a8:5c:6e:34:71:8c: 1d:d5:16:57:cc:80:37:4d:2c:8d:5c:79:2d:4e:22:d0:ef:42: ea:f9:21:4f:e9:b2:95:1a:4d:cc:0c:e2:87:2c:a4:1a:ed:a0: 55:0f:52:0c:24:b3:dc:1e:fd:f8:cf:df:91:3c:98:a7:8f:9f: e6:da:92:f7:13:d4:91:c2:cb:0a:40:12:fa:a0:db:57:4c:30: ae:65:47:5a:25:a5:40:7c:98:1e:2d:51:40:82:cc:5d:5c:34: d1:01:8d:e3:29:55:b1:f5:59:59:7c:55:72:e2:59:99:87:64: 3d:2b:9f:56:e9:53:13:73:af:ab:4c:e1:d8:26:be:73:7c:78: d7:0a:12:42 According to the above output, this certificate, which is signed by EnTrust, is valid for the following DNS host names:• routerlogin. net• routerlogin. key in the aforementioned firmware image. mini-app. funjsq. com In the same firmware image was an additional valid TLS Certificate and its corresponding private key. pem. funjsq. com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public-Key: 2048 bit Modulus: 00:cc:57:d5:45:ad:bd:60:c8:af:6f:50:97:ef:df: 67:b0:1d:69:1d:a3:75:e9:ba:08:8d:4c:54:2e:b6: 83:1c:2e:e1:1f:66:0c:fb:7a:d0:9a:ce:52:a4:3f: 75:70:f4:39:73:f3:f5:86:2e:96:59:e6:a5:54:62: 17:52:15:ad:6f:22:bd:7d:84:36:14:7a:3b:1c:60: 61:7a:7d:86:d8:e2:99:49:d4:06:e9:7a:00:f2:43: f9:11:87:06:c8:20:0e:fc:15:51:bb:13:9d:ed:27: 39:df:cd:ec:46:6f:ed:a7:56:4f:71:a3:46:d7:25: f2:5a:38:a9:23:a1:89:0e:6e:f1:3d:6b:04:05:0e: 8b:32:bc:f1:1c:0e:f8:6c:95:e2:cd:6c:38:1a:e6: a6:3f:3b:22:41:f7:23:45:36:82:58:3c:a5:89:aa: 6e:16:e0:32:c2:38:a8:42:ba:de:ae:b4:03:f3:0b: a4:9e:6b:a6:31:68:14:da:20:93:aa:a7:a7:49:f4: 6d:3e:c8:39:72:e1:62:35:cc:67:3f:08:2e:ae:8b: ac:fc:14:3b:9d:b8:c7:5b:9b:db:08:3a:2b:98:aa: 0e:3e:92:5c:e7:e6:db:13:bb:47:e0:3b:3d:60:e5: f3:22:e8:8f:01:04:cf:e3:c3:fc:7e:e2:6c:23:2c: 48:17 Exponent: 65537 0x10001 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:90:AF:6A:3A:94:5A:0B:D8:90:EA:12:56:73:DF:43:B4:3A:28:DA:E7 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 27:B5:A2:32:E3:84:92:C6:D3:38:A3:83:6A:61:B2:C0:E7:43:53:1D X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Key Encipherment X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE X509v3 Extended Key Usage: TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 1. 6449. comodo. 140. comodoca. comodoca. comodoca. com X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: DNS:mini-app. funjsq. com, DNS:www. mini-app. funjsq. com CT Precertificate SCTs: Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : EE:4B:BD:B7:75:CE:60:BA:E1:42:69:1F:AB:E1:9E:66: A3:0F:7E:5F:B0:72:D8:83:00:C4:7B:89:7A:A8:FD:CB Timestamp : Jul 26 14:44:17. 854 2018 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:46:02:21:00:94:5A:FE:A8:70:93:59:E5:0A:F1:B5: 29:FE:2E:0D:91:34:D5:A8:A9:1D:C1:63:77:16:F3:75: 67:16:6C:25:33:02:21:00:93:66:BA:D6:27:57:D8:59: A5:C7:73:87:23:AB:F9:84:D9:DD:BA:50:A7:FC:5E:8E: 40:74:A0:DD:9C:BA:CF:BD Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : 5E:A7:73:F9:DF:56:C0:E7:B5:36:48:7D:D0:49:E0:32: 7A:91:9A:0C:84:A1:12:12:84:18:75:96:81:71:45:58 Timestamp : Jul 26 14:44:18. 391 2018 GMT Extensions: none Signature : ecdsa-with-SHA256 30:45:02:21:00:F1:07:91:63:03:B7:51:60:5F:ED:FD: 72:43:E7:8F:98:34:A8:9E:85:CF:C1:33:AB:AF:7C:C1: B3:16:75:A8:79:02:20:30:F7:DB:8E:C7:D3:9F:86:42: 80:B7:C6:6B:0D:D5:14:85:99:BC:3F:99:79:D3:43:24: 3C:17:4F:2E:BE:A6:6A Signed Certificate Timestamp: Version : v1 0x0 Log ID : 55:81:D4:C2:16:90:36:01:4A:EA:0B:9B:57:3C:53:F0: C0:E4:38:78:70:25:08:17:2F:A3:AA:1D:07:13:D3:0C Timestamp : Jul 26 14:44:17. funjsq. com. Rationale for Full Disclosure We are aware that Netgear has public bug bounty programs. However, at current date those programs do not allow public disclosure under any circumstances. We as researchers felt that the public should know about these certificate leaks in order to adequately protect themselves and that the certificates in question should be revoked so that major browsers do not trust them any longer. We could not guarantee either if we had used the existing bug bounty programs. Disclosure Timeline• Tuesday, January 14th 2020 - Initial Discovery• Tuesday, January 14 2020 - Tweet sent attempting to establish communications with Netgear• Wednesday, January 15 2020 - Reached out to Bugcrowd to attempt to establish communications. Thursday, January 16 - Bugcrowd responds, but we are unable to establish a communications channel outside of the Netgear bug bounty programs. Friday, Jaunary 17th - Conversation with bugcrowd proves inconclusive• Sunday, January 19th - Feeling we have exhausted our disclosure avenues, we decide to publish Credits• Tom Pohl tompohl• Nick Starke nstarke Well done, and thanks for sharing your research! Even though some people on HN are critical about going full disclosure on this one, I think it is up to you guys to decide on how to proceed with such a finding. Netgear seems to lack proper opsec when not one but two private key files are included in the public firmware release. This seems deliberate, so that the routers can serve their internal configuration page from over HTTPS without having browsers show a self-signed certificate error. Sure, exposing the certificate makes HTTPS worthless for the domain, but so does using a self-signed certificate, and it's better than using plaintext HTTP for the configuration page, which so many vendors do. This seems deliberate, so that the routers can serve their internal configuration page from over HTTPS without having browsers show a self-signed certificate error. Sure, exposing the certificate makes HTTPS worthless for the domain, but so does using a self-signed certificate, and it's better than using plaintext HTTP for the configuration page, which so many vendors do. That's a plausible explanation. I totally forgot to think about this aspect. However, Netgear's attempt at HTTPS is going into the direction of "security by obscurity".. It would probably be wise to report this to mozilla. dev. security. policy as well, for the browser community to evaluate the conduct of the CA in issuing this certificate and possible ways to avoid such issues recurring. How is it the problem of any CA? They have nothing to do with irresponsible vendors publishing private keys. As long as they don't refuse to revoke it all is fine. This seems deliberate, so that the routers can serve their internal configuration page from over HTTPS without having browsers show a self-signed certificate error. Sure, exposing the certificate makes HTTPS worthless for the domain, but so does using a self-signed certificate, and it's better than using plaintext HTTP for the configuration page, which so many vendors do. Correct me if I'm wrong. But a self-signed certificate where the private key is not known is definitely better for security than a signed certificate with a known private key. This is just as worthless as using HTTP. I think it's even worse, because users see the green lock in the address bar and think they have a secure connection but in reality their traffic can be decrypted by everyone. This is obviously for the router config page. Unfortunately, doing this is a violation of the WebPKI rules, and thus full disclosure was a reasonable action here; the right thing to do is to simultaneously notify the issuing CA so that the certificate is revoked in the next 24h. I get what Netgear was trying to do here, but it doesn't work. Router configuration pages are outside the scope of HTTPS browser trust, because you need internet access to get any sort of personalized certificate e. Let's Encrypt , and you need to be able to configure your router before you have internet access. There's no solution here other than using unencrypted HTTP for initial setup or dealing with security warnings. Vendors have tried this stuff time and time again, and they just get their certificates revoked. It would be nice if we had a solution for encrypt-only no trust HTTP, but the browsers have collectively decided that's a bad idea. So here we are. Sucks to be Netgear. It would probably be wise to report this to mozilla. dev. security. policy as well, for the browser community to evaluate the conduct of the CA in issuing this certificate and possible ways to avoid such issues recurring. How is it the problem of any CA? They have nothing to do with irresponsible vendors publishing private keys. As long as they don't refuse to revoke it all is fine. Web browser vendors and others can apply pressure onto CAs to comply by threat to not trust them any longer but they cannot apply pressure onto the certificate owners, i. However the CAs can apply pressure onto their customers through their service contracts as well as refusal of service. It's better than HTTP because it requires active MitM It's worse than HTTP because it gives the user a false sense of security. Thanks for sharing : Correct me if I'm wrong. But a self-signed certificate where the private key is not known is definitely better for security than a signed certificate with a known private key. Unfortunately you are very wrong here: Self-signed certs train the user in a wrong direction. They will highly likely accept rouge certs for other services like bank https , too. That is why every browser vendor played whack-a-mole changing the dialog s for accepting these certs and made them look really scary. It's a solution to an unsolved problem... It is NOT a solution, it is a very bad hack. There's no solution here other than using unencrypted HTTP for initial setup or dealing with security warnings. Vendors have tried this stuff time and time again, and they just get their certificates revoked. That is not exactly true: If you throw enough money at the problem, there will be a solution. In this case, have the router https page under an individual URL like. routerlogin. net and ship each device with its own cert and key for this url only. It's better than HTTP because it requires active MitM It's worse than HTTP because it gives the user a false sense of security. Thanks for sharing : This is the best explainaition of this complicated topic i have ever read. How can embedded device manufacturers provide browser based configuration without scaring away users? They are not the only vendor doing this. By embedding a device-specific directly in the hardware and shipping a matching certificate. But that would increase the cost and therefore most vendors are not willing to do it. This can be used when securing access to configuration files for network deployment, e. to not leak the SIP passwords. Works the other way around too, only downside is that the certificate itself needs to have a life time matching the hardware. How can embedded device manufacturers provide browser based configuration without scaring away users? Have each device use a unique certificate and keys. Ideally, the device will generate and store the private key in a piece of protected hardware which will allow for the device to generate a certificate signing request which the manufacturer can then sign and push back into the device on the assembly line. Then, when a new firmware comes out, it doesn't have any keys in it, the keys are already in each device secured in a hardware "vault. Because each device has a unique set of keys and certificate, the manufacturer can verify that the device which is making the new certificate signing request over the Internet is the same one which they signed on the manufacturing line, and so can sign this new request too. Some privacy or manufacturer expected life concerns may arise here. In Netgear's case, it seems like their router needs to be your DNS server when you connect, so that they can use the routerlogin. net name in their certificate. For devices which will be accessed using a name which the device doesn't know at manufacturing time, then a slightly different procedure may be needed, although the device likely can reach the Internet most of the time if it is a non-router consumer network device, so could simply figure out what name the customer will access it by and perform the certificate signing request as above during setup rather than waiting until the original cert expires. There's no need to ruminate over how to solve this problem. It's fairly straightforward. From Things to do instead of shipping TLS certs and static private keys to consumer-grade routers you sell by the thousand:• Generate a unique keypair per device. Use this keypair to communicate upstream, in a similar fashion to CloudFlare's Keyless SSL. Profit! This keypair you generate on the device would need to be preloaded at the factory, unique per device, and the public key would need to be stored in a database. When a TLS handshake comes in, you verify the entire request is signed by that keypair before signing it. Delegated online signing for a TLS handshake isn't even in the top 10 engineering challenges for cryptography in the 2020s. Oh, and, if you don't have connectivity to upstream and your need users to connect to configure something? These are solved problems. Netgear just has to care about implementing the solutions. They don't care. In addition to what was already said, CAs are stewards of the public trust and have invested substantial time and resources - including in legal threats against browsers - to try and keep it that way. Incidents like this are clear and objective evidence they are poor stewards undeserving of that trust. There's no need to ruminate over how to solve this problem. It's fairly straightforward. It is not that straightforward. Using a router as wireless access point without network access is a perfectly reasonable use case. Heck, on first use Internet access is often not available because the router hasn't been configured appropriately yet. As so often, the devil is in the details. Just shipping a 2k RSA certificate with 10a life time per device can't be that costly though. It is a bug because they aren't allowed to do this per the WebPKI requirements, and their CA must and will revoke the certificate now, which means the feature will stop working. It doesn't matter whether you think the way the feature works is acceptable; the rules are the rules and as soon as they get caught doing this, as they have now, the certificate will be revoked, so they can't do this unless they want to have features that only work until someone discovers how they work. In defence of netgear: You failed to determine the use case and problem: The "URL" used here is a pseudo-URL used to configure a router. While Netgear owns the actual domain, nothing is there and you are redirected to Netgear instead. For configuring the router you may assume that there is NO way to connect to the internet at the point where the user connects to this pseudo-URL with content served by the router. Browsers like Chrome have chosen to show scary warning signs if a website is used which does not use HTTPS. provides good reasoning: Avoid users calling support over this expected non-issue. So "Use this keypair to communicate upstream" is not possible, and "generate a new private key and signing request and send it over the Internet" is similarly not possible. Having a router specific certificate incurs high cost and certificates expire. So not a solution either. The proper solution is what Verizon does. They have every gateway use a self-signed certificate. When you go to the IP address with http, it shows a message warning you that it will redirect to https and you will get a certificate error. If you don't understand that, you probably shouldn't be accessing the router interface. It seems Netgear is already patching this stuff out of some of their devices. In this firmware it's self-signed and in its predecessor it's an Entrust certificate which is expired by now. In the release notes of 2. " In my opinion Netgear was very well aware of this screw-up prior to this bug report.

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00:9a:cd:2d:1b:12, 00:ee:bd:5b:fe:f3, 00:ee:bd:a1:60:ec, 00:ee:bd:b0:a5:52, 04:db:56:4f:94:30, 0c:d6:bd:b2:da:3f, 10:2a:b3:c9:3d:a5, 10:a5:d0:b1:87:a6, 10:d5:42:62:a7:3e, 14:49:e0:b2:ec:de, 18:f6:43:b1:eb:6f, 1c:56:fe:9b:1d:f9, 1c:cb:99:8f:31:97, 24:da:9b:1a:67:4d, 28:b2:bd:79:c3:a4, 2c:33:7a:50:71:7f, 2c:8a:72:8d:a2:3e, 2c:8a:72:b7:1f:36, 2c:8a:72:b7:86:73, 34:a3:95:bd:f7:14, 34:aa:8b:9a:5a:49, 40:33:1a:bc:66:71, 40:40:a7:2c:8e:aa, 40:40:a7:3f:75:b0, 40:78:6a:39:13:05, 40:b8:37:a3:12:4e, 40:f3:08:04:a8:59, 44:80:eb:77:88:d5, 44:80:eb:b5:7a:c3, 44:80:eb:cb:5e:77, 48:5a:3f:22:72:5c, 48:d7:05:c3:43:8f, 4c:21:d0:28:e6:96, 4c:74:03:6f:ba:87, 4c:7c:5f:5a:ec:92, 4c:a5:6d:71:9c:43, 50:2e:5c:42:72:00, 50:32:75:c2:d0:a5, 54:4e:90:e2:ec:aa, 58:44:98:18:4c:e1, 58:44:98:a1:ac:b4, 58:7f:57:3b:ea:dd, 58:b6:33:09:78:d8, 60:7e:dd:ff:58:ac, 64:89:9a:4e:02:9d, 64:bc:0c:2c:5c:5a, 6c:40:08:a8:b2:b4, 70:14:a6:92:2e:1d, 70:18:8b:cb:93:ed, 70:72:0d:b0:0e:03, 70:ec:e4:a7:35:7a, 74:5c:9f:43:65:40, 74:75:48:9b:82:12, 78:4b:87:64:c7:dd, 80:be:05:45:3a:f4, 84:38:38:6f:a8:e6, 84:7a:88:1b:0d:ba, 88:63:df:65:fb:ac, 8c:34:fd:0f:2f:20, 94:e9:6a:d6:7b:1a, 9c:35:eb:d4:b1:1b, a4:31:35:dc:8b:14, a4:77:33:25:32:1a, a8:a6:68:f4:30:fd, ac:29:3a:33:a0:49, ac:7a:4d:04:0a:68, ac:b5:7d:76:e1:3d, Apple_3e:a0:c3

08 c6 3a 0c 76 a9 67 f2 d4

exe" Registry Keys Modified• exe• exe HTTP Requests• exe• tgz• google. hystream221. segodnya. www. google.

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Netgear TLS Private Key Disclosure through Device Firmware Images · GitHub

08 c6 3a 0c 76 a9 67 f2 d4

exe" Registry Keys Modified• exe• exe HTTP Requests• exe• tgz• google. hystream221. segodnya. www. google.

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